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1. Introduction
Ever since ﬁ  rms grew large and became funded by a vari-
ety of investors, they have had to deal with the separation 
of ownership and control and the associated agency prob-
lems. Various corporate governance arrangements try to 
limit these problems as efﬁ  ciently as possible. Recently, 
corporate crises such as Enron and Worldcom in the US 
and Parmalat in Italy moved the corporate governance 
debate to the forefront of public policy on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  (1)
Most of the corporate governance debate has empha-
sised the governance of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, while 
little attention has been paid to the corporate governance 
of banks. Yet, corporate governance of banks differs from 
that of non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. In banks, debt holders are dis-
persed and non-experts, which limits the effectiveness of 
debt governance arrangements traditional in non-ﬁ  nan-
cial ﬁ  rms. In addition, the high proportion of debts in the 
total liabilities, and the resulting high leverage, facilitate 
risk shifting by shareholders. Hence there is a need for a 
representative of depositors to “mimic” the role taken by 
debt holders in non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Typically, this role will 
be performed by a regulatory and supervisory authority 
(hereafter called the “RSA”).
The stance taken in this paper goes beyond the usual efﬁ  -
ciency concern that underpins the corporate governance 
debate. Instead, we take a banking stability perspective. In 
particular, we stress that managers may be more risk averse 
than shareholders. Hence, it may be in the interest of the 
RSA to put more power in the hands of management 
vis-à-vis the shareholders. This is in contrast to traditional 
corporate governance recommendations for non-ﬁ  nancial 
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ﬁ  rms. In some countries, managerial control is legally pos-
sible through structures such as trusts. However, in others 
it is associated with dispersed shareholder structures. Here, 
however, another concern may be the stability of share-
holders when share ownership is dispersed. In this case, 
it may be difﬁ  cult to oblige shareholders to bail-in  (2) ailing 
banks in the event of under-capitalisation. This raises some 
trade-offs between various shareholder structures and the 
relative power of managers vis-à-vis shareholders. In par-
ticular, shareholder structure, management incentives and 
the structure of the board of directors are evaluated with 
respect to their impact on a bank’s risk.
The Belgian supervisory model tries to balance the respec-
tive power of shareholders and management by introducing 
the agreement on the autonomy of bank management.  (3) 
This agreement tries to combine the presence of strong ref-
erence shareholders with independent bank management. 
Initially, in 1959, it was meant to avoid shareholders’ inter-
vention in the credit policy of the bank (the risk of this kind 
of intervention was especially present in banks owned by 
an industrial holding company). The agreement was revised 
in 1992 to take account of a changing banking environ-
ment. However, the banking sector is still evolving. Capital 
markets and ﬁ  nancial regulation are becoming more and 
more internationally oriented, and so are shareholders. 
The presence of industrial holding companies in the Belgian 
banking landscape is tending to decrease. On the other 
hand, we observe an increase in ﬁ  nancial conglomerates. 
(1)  See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Becht et al. (2004) for surveys of the 
academic literature on corporate governance.
(2)  We refer to a bail-in as a situation in which shareholders have to provide 
additional capital to the bank in case of problems and to a bail-out as a situation 
in which the bank is recapitalised by an external party (e.g. the state, the 
regulators, etc.)
(3)  Protocole d’autonomie de la fonction bancaire / Overeenkomst over de autonomie 
in de bankfunctie.
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In parallel with these evolutions, banks have also modiﬁ  ed 
their governance structures over time. These modiﬁ  cations 
are to be seen as a response to pressures brought by the 
market to adapt to international standards and best prac-
tices. These observations raise several interesting questions. 
Is there still a need for an autonomy agreement  ? Is the 
agreement still optimal in the light of the recent develop-
ments in the banking landscape  ? Does it overlap with or 
contradict EU and national law  ? Is it still manageable in 
a changing environment where foreign shareholders pre-
dominate ? These questions are very complex, as corporate 
governance mechanisms result from a subtle equilibrium. 
The goal of this paper is to present a framework which 
allows for the conceptualisation of these issues. Therefore, 
the paper will provide an answer to some of these ques-
tions although others will remain unresolved.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theory on corporate governance in banking. Departing 
from the general framework for non-ﬁ  nancial organisa-
tions, it discusses why agency conﬂ  icts in banks are dif-
ferent and what the implications are for ﬁ  nancial regula-
tion. Section 3 analyses how the appropriate corporate 
governance structure can help to solve these agency 
conﬂ  icts. Shareholder structure, management incentives 
and the structure of the board of directors are evaluated 
with respect to their impact on a bank’s risk. In addition, 
several boxes in Section 3 present evidence on the gov-
ernance of Belgian banks at the end of 2003.(4) Section  4 
discusses and analyses the agreement on the autonomy 
of bank management in the light of Sections 2 and 3. 
Section 5 concludes.
2.   Corporate governance and banking : 
theory
2.1  Corporate governance in general
The general “corporate ﬁ  nance” problem facing busi-
ness undertakings is the one of raising ﬁ  nance efﬁ  ciently. 
This means raising ﬁ  nance in a way that limits the agency 
problems arising from the separation between owner-
ship and control. This separation, stressed originally by 
Berle and Means (1932), leads to classical problems 
identiﬁ  ed for example in Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
For instance, when outside ﬁ  nance is needed, manage-
ment efforts partly serve to repay outside investors. 
Thus, managers earn less than the full return on their 
effort, so that their incentive to exert effort is low. In 
a competitive capital market, managers end up bearing 
the cost of this distorted effort. Therefore, it is in both 
parties’ interest to set up governance mechanisms that 
limit agency distortions.
Governance mechanisms are associated with the different 
liabilities issued by the ﬁ  rm. They can be thought of as 
bundles of income rights as well as rights of control over 
the  ﬁ   rm. In the real world, two standard liabilities are 
prevalent, with a variety of speciﬁ  c features in both cases : 
debt and equity. Debt implies a payment that is concave in 
the proﬁ  t of the ﬁ  rm, and control of the ﬁ  rm is only given 
to debt holders in the case of lack of repayment (i.e. in 
“bad times”). The presence of debt leads to the possibility 
of excessive risk taking if management favours the inter-
est of shareholders. Indeed, equity implies a payment that 
is convex in the proﬁ  t of the ﬁ  rm; equity beneﬁ  ts from 
formal control (in the case of voting equity) unless debt is 
not repaid. This is explained in more detail in Box 1.
(4)  Bank governance is constantly evolving and some banks have announced their 
intention to change their governance structure. Therefore, as the evidence that is 
presented reﬂ  ects the situation at the end of 2003, it may no longer be accurate 
at the time of publication.
Box 1  – Risk  Shifting
Figure 1.1 presents the pay-off of shareholders and debt holders under different outcomes of cash ﬂ  ow (CF) for a 
leveraged ﬁ  rm. There are two states of the world, i.e. b (bad, or bankruptcy) and g (good, or continuity), each with 
probability 0.5. As long as CF < CF* (bad state), there is not enough cash ﬂ  ow to repay all debt obligations D, hence 
the ﬁ  rm goes bankrupt and debt holders are in control. They receive CF. Shareholders receive nothing. From the 
moment CF ≥  CF* (good state), the ﬁ  rm can repay its debt. Debt holders receive D, shareholders receive CF-D.
Now suppose the manager of the ﬁ  rm is also the owner or acts in the owner’s interest and has to choose between 
two projects, 1 and 2. The CF of each project depends on the state of the world and equals qi
j (i = 1,2 and j = b, g). 
Both projects have the same Net Present Value (NPV), i.e. 0.5q1
g   + 0.5q1
b  =  0.5q2
g   + 0.5q2
b . However, q1
g   < q2
g   and 
q1
b   > q2
b . This means that q1
g   – q1
b    < q2
g   – q2
b   , implying that project 2  is riskier than project 1. Now look at the 
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The widespread coexistence between debt and equity can 
be rationalised if the “course of action” that manage-
ment dislikes (e.g. restructuring) implies a reduction in the 
riskiness of ﬁ  rm proﬁ  t (e.g. scaling down or closing some 
activities). Then, in order to give managers incentives, it is 
optimal to put in charge an investor who is risk averse in 
bad times (or risk loving in good times) (Dewatripont and 
Tirole, 1994a). However, for this scheme to work, one needs 
investors with real control and not just formal control.(5) 
Here, we have to distinguish managers from investors as 
a whole, as well as the number of investors.
In Continental Europe, as far as debt governance is con-
cerned, bank lending remains the cornerstone in ﬁ  nanc-
ing most non-ﬁ  nancial companies. In this case, debt is in 
the hands of a few specialised debt holders, and formal 
control in fact means real control. Therefore, the extent 
of control depends essentially on the bankruptcy regime. 
In the United States, this regime is widely considered as 
manager- or debtor-friendly, by allowing ﬁ  rms in ﬁ  nancial 
distress ample opportunities to limit or delay creditor 
involvement.(6) In contrast, in the United Kingdom the 
bankruptcy regime is creditor-friendly, with Belgium 
closer to the UK model.  (7) In “bad times”, concentrated 
debt holders then have both the power and the incentives 
to protect their interest.
As far as equity governance is concerned, formal control 
is guaranteed by corporate law. This may operate directly 
through shareholder democracy or indirectly through the 
Board of Directors as the monitor of management. Real 
shareholder control depends, however, on the degree of 
shareholder dispersion (Barca and Becht, 2001  ; Franks 
and Mayer, 1994  ; and La Porta et al., 1998). The US 
and the UK typically have high shareholder dispersion, 
and therefore low incentives for individual shareholders 
to exert control. The main debate is thus how to curb 
excessive managerial power. In contrast, in Continental 
Europe, there is often the prevalence of big block-holders 
that have an incentive to monitor managers better but 
may abuse small shareholders. These two problems have 
to be kept in mind when analysing the features of equity 
governance, such as board composition (and in particular 
the notion of “independent director”), manager remu-
neration and appointment or dismissal, takeover rules, 
general voting rules at shareholder meetings, and so on.
pay-off of the two projects. The expected cash ﬂ  ow of the shareholder amounts to 0.5 [q1
g   – D] if project 1 is 
chosen and 0.5 [q2
g   – D] if project 2 is chosen. The debt holders’ expected cash ﬂ  ow equals 0.5 [q1
b   + D] for 
project 1 and 0.5  [q2
b   + D] for project 2.
Hence, shareholders will prefer the riskier project 2, while debt holders prefer the less risky project 1. As the NPV 
corrected for risk is higher for project 1, project 1 is optimal for the ﬁ  rm. However, as shareholders are in command 
when choosing the project, project 2 will be the outcome. They engage in risk shifting.











g g q q
(5)  To follow the terminology of Aghion and Tirole (1997), who distinguish the right 
to take decisions (formal control) from the ability to take decisions (real control), 
which typically requires prior information acquisition about the consequences 
of potential decisions. See also Burkart et al. (1997), who use the Aghion-Tirole 
framework to argue that shareholder dispersion reduces shareholder incentives to 
acquire information and therefore to exercise real control.
(6) Through  the  “Chapter 11” procedure.
(7)  One could see the recent introduction of the concordat regime in Belgium as an 
attempt to become somewhat more manager/debtor-friendly.98
2.2  Corporate governance and banking (8)
What is special about banks that justiﬁ  es they are regu-
lated differently from other ﬁ  rms ? First, “systemic risk” 
in case of failure is often invoked to justify regulation. 
Note that the same argument may hold in other strate-
gic industries or in cases where failure of a big ﬁ  rm has 
important repercussions on an entire region because of 
cascade effects on suppliers, creditors and even small 
and medium-sized ﬁ   rms that do a substantial share of 
their business with the laid-off employees of the failing 
ﬁ   rm. Strategic industries (such as the electricity sector, 
for instance) are often regulated as well. Yet this is not 
necessarily the case for big ﬁ   rms whose failure could 
cause cascade effects. Therefore, systemic risk per se does 
not fully separate banks from these big ﬁ  rms. One could, 
however, argue that the nature of ﬁ  nancial systems makes 
the occurrence of contagion effects more likely and the 
macro-economic consequences more widespread (for 
instance, interbank linkages and payment systems are 
natural channels for contagion).
A second element concerns the high leverage of banks. 
A higher percentage of debt used in the capital struc-
ture implies a higher possibility of risk shifting and debt 
  overhang.
A third key speciﬁ  city of ﬁ  nancial institutions concerns 
their governance, because of the nature of its claim hol-
ders. In non-ﬁ  nancial companies, debt holders are often 
banks themselves, which have the necessary expertise 
and play an important role in disciplining management 
in the case of ﬁ  nancial distress, e.g. in order to avoid 
“gambling for resurrection”. By contrast, ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions have liabilities held by dispersed non-experts, 
namely depositors. In such cases, there is a need for 
a  debt holder representative, which is a fundamen-
tal role for the RSA.  (9) The same is true for insurance 
companies or pension funds, two sets of institutions 
whose regulation shares many similarities with banking 
regulation (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994b). Exiting, 
however, is easier for depositors than for policy holders. 
Therefore, we can expect that depositors exert discipline 
by voting with their feet, while insurance policy holders 
have an incentive to control ex-ante.
The need for a strong depositor representative is espe-
cially great the more the credit institution is allowed to 
take risks. Such risks are prevalent in banking since, 
beyond their essential role in payment systems, another 
banking function is to provide liquidity for individu-
als, through demand deposits. Avoiding systemic risk 
through self-fulﬁ  lling panics has required at least partial 
deposit insurance, which further reduces depositors’ 
incentives to become expert in assessing the risks 
taken by their bank and creates moral hazard. This 
increases the need for regulation limiting the ability of 
  shareholders to “play with the money of the deposit 
insurance fund”.
There are several ways in which the RSA acts as debt 
holder representative.
First, by imposing several sets of constraints on ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, which serve to ensure their solvency and 
to avoid systemic externalities. (i) Regulation of market 
structure may limit competition and hence increase char-
ter value and improve stability. (ii) Prudential regulation 
sets limits on the structure of ﬁ  nancial institutions’ liabili-
ties, in the form of “capital requirements” and limits on 
the riskiness of their asset portfolio. (iii) Additional “good 
practice” requirements aim at improving the governance 
of the ﬁ   nancial institution. The paper mainly focuses 
on this last element. Second, ex-post, by threatening a 
“get-tough-policy” when these are not respected, with 
the RSA taking control and possibly closing or selling the 
ﬁ  nancial institution. This broadly mimics the role of debt 
as a contingent control arrangement in non-ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms, where control over the ﬁ  rm switches to creditors 
in bad times.
3.   Bank Governance structures : 
implications for risk management 
and stability
Financial regulators increasingly acknowledge the impor-
tance of corporate governance. While Basel I determines 
capital requirements by deﬁ  ning capital weights for differ-
ent categories of assets, Basel II allows some use of internal 
risk modelling techniques. This signals a partial move from 
a “regulatory” to a more “supervisory” approach by the 
RSA.  (10) In turn, the RSA needs to rely more on the supervi-
sion of the procedures having an impact on these internal 
models. The organisation of these procedures relies heavily 
on the speciﬁ  cs of the corporate governance of banks.
The need to focus on the corporate governance of banks 
is also partly the result of the gradual elimination of activ-
ity restrictions, limiting the scope of banking activities. 
While the 1930’s had seen the widespread introduction 
(8)  For details, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994b) and Heremans (2000).
(9)  While these regulators are civil servants, “private representatives” would be 
possible, in the same way that dispersed shareholders have representatives 
through the Board of Directors.
(10)  A regulatory approach focuses primarily on the assessment of the quality of 
the bank’s balance sheet at a point in time, and then determines whether the 
bank complies with capital requirements and restrictions on asset holdings. 
A supervisory approach focuses more on the soundness of the bank’s 
management practices with regard to controlling risk (Mishkin, 2000).99
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of activity restrictions as a way to limit the possibility of 
contagion in the banking sector, many of these have been 
lifted since the 1970’s and the subsequent deregulation. 
In Belgium this has resulted in a banking landscape where 
most banking activities are conducted as part of “bancas-
surance” conglomerates. The complex nature of poten-
tial spill-overs between business lines then calls for the 
supervision of internal risk procedures as a complement 
to more “standard” banking regulation and also suggests 
strengthened co-operation between RSA in banking and 
insurance industries.
The problem facing the RSA can be summarised as fol-
lows  : while modern banking regulation of the Basel I 
type is the natural counterpart to the debt-and-equity 
governance of non-ﬁ  nancial  ﬁ   rms, it is not foolproof 
in a world of deregulated banks and accounting lags. 
Limitations on the effectiveness of regulation imply that 
excessive risk taking by banks remains a real problem. 
Hence, the goal of banking supervision is to complement 
regulations to further limit excessive risk taking. The 
supervision of banks’ corporate governance structures 
can be analysed in this light. This implies that particular 
emphasis should be placed on the risk attitudes of the 
parties exerting real control over banking decisions and 
how these attitudes and relative powers can be inﬂ  u-
enced (through ﬁ   nancial incentives, through “bail-in”
obligations, etc.).
We now turn to the impact of corporate governance 
structures, such as ownership structure, board compo-
sition and management incentives, on risk taking and 
stability of the banking sector. In doing this, we follow 
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) or Hart (1995a, b). They 
view organisational decisions as being determined by 
the power and the incentives of the different parties 
involved. Corporate governance structures inﬂ  uence 
these incentives and powers. Beyond this, we should 
remember that, in banks, apart from managers and 
shareholders, the party potentially in control is the debt 
holder representative, the RSA, rather than debt hold-
ers themselves. Moreover, another difference in relation 
to the stance taken in the literature on non-banking 
organisations is that we do not discuss the organisa-
tion of corporate governance structures from the point 
of view of proﬁ   t maximisation. Rather, we perform 
the analysis from the RSA’s point of view, that is, the 
enhancement of ﬁ  nancial stability. This being said, we 
shall draw both from the literature of non-ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms and from the (much smaller) literature devoted to 
  banking   organisations.
3.1   Risk attitudes and the control of corporations
As stressed in Section 2, in non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, 
formal control lies with risk-loving shareholders in good 
times and with risk-averse debt holders in bad times. In 
the banking context, due to the high leverage and dis-
persed debt holders, there is a concern that shareholders 
may face greater risk taking incentives than sharehold-
ers of non-ﬁ  nancial  ﬁ   rms. Indeed, in the absence of 
regulatory intervention, given the high leverage and the 
dispersion of debt holders, shareholders beneﬁ  t  from 
a higher potential for risk-shifting and gambling for 
  resurrection.
But what about managers, when they enjoy real control ? 
One could argue that, in a typical ﬁ  rm, managers would 
be intrinsically more risk averse than shareholders, for two 
reasons. First, they stand to lose invested speciﬁ  c human 
capital and, in some cases, invested wealth if the bank 
goes bankrupt. A second reason concerns the possibility 
of diversifying. Managers tie up all their human capital 
in the ﬁ  rm, so their degree of diversiﬁ  cation is limited. 
Hence, they care about the total risk of the ﬁ  rm,  i.e. 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Diversiﬁ  ed shareholders 
on the other hand only care about systematic risk. 
Therefore, they could intuitively tolerate more risk than 
managers would be willing to accept.
The above argument implicitly assumes the absence of an 
RSA and the existence of a ﬁ  xed compensation scheme 
for managers. Things can change when managers start 
receiving performance-based pay. With regard to the cash 
ﬂ   ow effect, managers face a trade-off between future 
cash ﬂ  ows generated by speciﬁ  c human capital invested in 
the ﬁ  rm and additional cash ﬂ  ows generated by increased 
performance resulting from increased risk taking. When 
linked to share prices, managerial incentives become 
more aligned with those of shareholders, even though the 
above considerations imply that the manager may remain 
more risk averse than shareholders. Things can, however, 
be different when managers are paid with stock-options, 
whose value can be very sensitive to the volatility of the 
underlying stock. In fact, above a certain threshold of 
option-based pay, managers may receive more incentives 
to take risks than shareholders. This is especially the case 
when options have a high exercise value and are out of 
the money.
From the RSA’s point of view, one can thus say that, 
except for very high-powered incentive schemes, mana-
gerial control should reduce excessive risk taking. This 
may no longer be true when option-based pay is very 
signiﬁ  cant. This type of remuneration is more likely the 
more diversiﬁ  ed shareholders are, because diversiﬁ  cation 100
increases their tolerance to risk. Banking stability concerns 
therefore provide an argument for :
– favouring managerial control over shareholder control 
when managerial pay is not too sensitive to share 
prices ;
– limiting option-based managerial compensation.  (11)
In practice, several studies have found that regulatory 
frameworks inﬂ  uence the impact of both (i) managerial 
ownership and (ii) pay-performance scheme on risk taking 
and performance in banks.
Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) use a sample of 38 US 
bank holding companies over 1978-1985, a period of rel-
ative deregulation. They ﬁ  nd that banks whose managers 
hold a relatively large portion of the shares exhibit a signif-
icantly higher risk taking behaviour. Anderson and Fraser 
(2000) use a panel of 150 US banks covering the period 
1987-1994. They ﬁ   nd that total and ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c  risk 
are positively related to managerial ownership between 
1987 and 1989. On the other hand, they also ﬁ  nd that, 
after regulatory changes in 1989 and 1991 (which were 
designed to reduce risk taking and led to higher franchise 
values), bank risk was negatively related to managerial 
shareholdings (i.e. over 1992-1994). Systematic risk was 
unrelated to ownership in both periods. Lee (2002) uses 
a sample of 65 bank holding companies over the period 
1987-1996 and ﬁ   nds that risk taking in banks where 
managers hold a large proportion of shares is more 
pronounced for banks with a relatively low probability of 
failure. This is in line with the diversiﬁ  cation argument.
Houston and James (1995) use a sample of 134 banks 
covering the period 1980-1990. They ﬁ  nd that, compared 
to CEOs in other industries, bank CEOs receive in abso-
lute value less cash compensation (although their cash 
compensation is more sensitive to ﬁ  rm performance), are 
less likely to participate in a stock option plan, hold fewer 
stock options and receive a smaller percentage of their 
total compensation in the form of options and stock. They 
ﬁ  nd no evidence that the total pay-performance sensitivity 
is higher in banking and no signiﬁ  cant relation between 
the reliance on equity-based compensation and bank risk. 
They conclude that shareholders do not use CEO equity-
based compensation to promote risk taking, but cannot 
rule out alternative mechanisms (e.g. cash-based compen-
sation) as incentives for managers to increase risk taking. 
They attribute this to the fact that banks are   regulated. 
John and Qian (2003) use a sample of 123 banks over 
1992-2000 and ﬁ  nd that the pay-performance sensitiv-
ity of bank management seems to be lower than in 
other industries. They ﬁ   nd that an increase of $  1000 
in shareholder value triggers an increase of $ 4.7 in the 
ﬁ  rm-related wealth of bank CEOs vs. $ 17.5 for non-bank 
CEOs (i.e. a statistically signiﬁ  cant difference of $ 12.8). 
They attribute this result to the fact that the banking 
industry has high debt ratios and is regulated.
3.2 Equity  governance
The real power of shareholders depends very much on 
its degree of dispersion. As long ago as 1932, Berle and 
Means called attention to the prevalence of widely held 
corporations in the US, in which ownership was dispersed 
among small shareholders, and real control was concen-
trated in the hands of managers. As stressed by Barca and 
Becht (2001), Franks and Mayer (1994) or La Porta et al. 
(1998), publicly-traded ﬁ  rms in Continental Europe are pre-
dominantly controlled by “block-holders”. This shifts the 
corporate governance debate away from a shareholder-
manager conﬂ  ict, as controlling shareholders face strong 
incentives to monitor managers and maximise proﬁ  ts when 
they retain substantial cash-ﬂ  ow rights in addition to con-
trol. A new concern arises however  : the risk of expropria-
tion of minority shareholders by block-holders.
As far as banking stability is concerned, the structure of 
ownership also matters for its impact on the riskiness of the 
bank. When shareholders acquire real control by holding 
substantial voting rights, it is easier for them to push man-
agers to engage in risk shifting (Harm, 2002, Caprio and 
Levine, 2002) and increases the potential to extract private 
beneﬁ  ts (Bebchuk, 1999). However, in the case of ﬁ  nancial 
distress, a bail-in may be easier to organise when there is 
a well-identiﬁ  ed block-holder, which may in turn induce 
him to take less risk (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998 and 
Hagelin, 2003). As already stressed, shareholder dispersion 
thus has a potentially ambiguous effect on banking stability 
(see also Saunders, Strock and Travlos, 1990).
In the case of dispersed ownership, individual sharehold-
ers have little incentive to monitor managers and would 
rather free-ride on others. This means real control for 
managers who, except in the case of very high-powered 
incentive schemes, have less of an incentive to engage in 
excessive risk taking. However, dispersed ownership may 
also lead to potentially unstable ownership (i.e. sharehold-
ers voting with their feet when trouble is under way, or 
unﬁ  t shareholders gaining control over the bank by acquir-
ing shares on the market). This may frustrate banking 
stability objectives.
(11)  In practice, in a competitive managerial market, it may be difﬁ  cult to limit 
option-based compensation. If the decrease in the option-based remuneration 
is not compensated by an increase in the cash remuneration, there is a risk that 
banks would no longer be able to attract good managers. On the other hand, 
if this decrease is compensated by higher ﬁ  xed remuneration, banks may attract 
managers who would prefer higher ﬁ  xed remuneration and lower variable 
compensation, i.e. risk averse managers.101
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Apart from the extent of shareholder dispersion, risk 
taking is also going to be inﬂ   uenced by the identity of 
the controlling shareholder. Risk incentives may differ if 
a bank is owned by another ﬁ  nancial institution, a family, 
an industrial ﬁ  rm, or its own management. Indeed, these 
different owners have different opportunities to diversify 
their wealth and hence different attitudes to risk. Moreover, 
they differ in their information, expertise and monitoring 
capabilities. As shown in Box 2, most Belgian banks are 
owned by other ﬁ   nancial institutions. This may increase 
the possibility of contagion (through the direct impact on 
the balance sheet and ﬁ  nancial links or through spill-over 
effects). On the other hand, banks may be effective moni-
tors of other banks, especially if they have large exposures 
on the interbank market. Cross-shareholding may also be 
useful as an incentive to perform this monitoring role.
Box 2  –  Shareholding structure in Belgian ﬁ  nancial groups
TABLE 2.1 FIVE LARGEST DIRECT SHAREHOLDERS OF A SAMPLE OF BELGIAN FINANCIAL GROUPS (1)
Sources: Annual Reports, Banks’ website, ING, Bankscope.
(1) An ultimate owner or controlling shareholder is a shareholder holding directly or indirectly more than 20 p.c. of the shares (La Porta et al. 1998). It is believed 20 p.c. 
of the shares is often enough to control a company.
(2) December 2003.
(3) On April 24, 2003, Suez issued a 3-year convertible bond which will be redeemed at maturity in a maximum of 70 million Fortis shares. Suez’s potential voting rights 
(fully diluted) will then drop from 6.40 p.c. to 1.44 p.c. or more.
(4) See separate Box 3.
(5) Listed shareholders acting jointly.
(6) December 2002 except Banque Degroof and ING Belgium: December 2003.
(7) Ultimate owner is Mutuelles AXA.
(8) Owned by Ackermans & van Haaren (60 p.c.) and Groep J. Van Breda (40 p.c.).




1 2 3 4 5 Names
(In percentages)
Listed (2)
Dexia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349,888 15.3 14.9 7.7 5.7 3.1 (1) Arcofin; (2) Holding Communal; (3) Caisse 
des Dépôts et Consignations (French State); 
(4) Ethias; (5) Deutsche Bank
Fortis (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . 523,250 6.1 5.5 2.8 2.3 1.7 (1) Suez Groupe; (2) Stichting VSB Fonds; 
(3) Fortales; (4) Munchener Ruckversicherung; 
(5) Fortis
KBC bank and 
insurance (4)  . . . . . . . . 225,587 66.7 1.9 (1) Almanij; (2) KBC Group Companies
Keytrade (5)   . . . . . . . . 368 28.5 22.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 (1) Van Moer, Santerre et Cie; (2) Compagnie 
Centrale 1909; (3) De Streel Grégoire; 
(4) Zurtstrassen Jean-Guillaume; 
(5) Zurtstrassen José-Charles
Not listed (6)
Axa Belgium  . . . . . . . 13,981 100.0 (1) Axa Group (7)
Banque Degroof  . . . . 2,550 36.5 16.3 13.2 11.9 4.0 (1) Guimard Finance SA and families 
Philippson, Siaens, Fontaine, Schockert, 
Haegelsteen; (2) Active Partners; 
(3) Compagnie du Bois Sauvage; 
(4) Management & Personel; (5) Parmafin 
(Family Theo Maes)
HSBC – Dewaay   . . . . 343 100 (1) HSBC
Bank Corluy   . . . . . . . 102 62.5 37.5 (1) Group Corluy (family); (2) Mercator Bank 
en Verzekering
Bank Delen  . . . . . . . . 846 100 (1) Finaxis (8)
Bank J. Van Breda . . . 1,901 100 (1) Finaxis (8)
ING Belgium  . . . . . . . 121,045 99.6 (1) ING Group (9)
!102
Shareholders exert power through their voting rights. In 
some environments, voting rights are directly proportional 
to cash-ﬂ  ow rights, so that it is enough to look at owner-
ship concentration to have an idea of formal control rights 
of shareholders. In other environments, there is widespread 
use of technologies that give shareholders voting rights in 
excess of their cash-ﬂ  ow rights. Box 3 explains these mech-
anisms in detail. In most cases, these mechanisms are used 
to increase the power of the large shareholder, who may 
ﬁ  nd such a strategy attractive when wealth constrained and 
only willing to invest if in control. As controlling sharehold-
ers value a voting premium as a form of private beneﬁ  t, 
they will not sell their shares to small shareholders. This is 
because small shareholders do not value these private ben-
eﬁ  ts and hence will not be willing to pay for these voting 
rights (Grossman and Hart, 1998). These mechanisms may 
therefore lead to stable control.
Recently, however, there have been many debates about 
whether these mechanisms are a sign of bad corpo-
rate governance.  (12) This is because control rights that 
The shareholding structures of the various Belgian banking groups differ widely (Table 2.1). The shareholding 
structure of Fortis, the largest Belgian ﬁ  nancial group, is dispersed. However, Fortis has two reference shareholders : 
Suez Group and VSB Fonds. They both hold around 6 p.c. of the shares. KBC has a more concentrated ownership. 
The main shareholder of KBC is Cera Holding (through its participating interest in Almanij). As explained in Box 3, 
the shareholding is more or less similar to a pyramid. The shareholding structure of Dexia is relatively concentrated, 
as two shareholders each have more than 14 p.c. of the shares and 2 others both have more than 5 p.c. of the 
shares. Finally, ING Belgium is a subsidiary of ING group, a Dutch company. The smaller banks that are presented 
tend to have concentrated ownership.
Note also that although some large ﬁ  nancial groups are listed, individual banking entities are not (the only 
exception being Keytrade). The fact that the banking activity is not listed has an impact on market discipline. 
Indeed, direct market discipline on bank entities through share price cannot be exercised, even though banks are 
generally monitored by rating agencies.
Table 2.2 presents a breakdown of banks by the identity of their direct main shareholder. We observe that a large 
number (39 p.c.) of Belgian banks are owned by foreign shareholders, generally foreign ﬁ  nancial institutions, yet 
they only represent 18 p.c. of the total assets of Belgian banks. Note that if we add to this the 20 p.c. owned 
by Belgian ﬁ  nancial institutions, we ﬁ  nd that 59 p.c. of Belgian banks are owned by another ﬁ  nancial institution, 
accounting for 39 p.c. of the total assets of Belgian banks.
(12)  In its effort to draft a “takeover directive”, the European Commission proposed 
to ban multiple voting rights. In Belgium, dual voting rights within one class of 
shares are not allowed and one-share-one-vote is the rule (art 541 corporate 
law). The OECD principles on corporate governance (2004) do not go that far, 
only stipulating that such arrangements should be disclosed. From a banking 
stability point of view, note that some of these arrangements may have some 
beneﬁ  ts when they lead to stable ownership structures.
TABLE 2.2 OWNERS OF BELGIAN BANKS
(December 2003)
Sources: CBFA, Bankscope, Schema A and own calculations.
(1) Other includes: (i) public authorities, (ii) consortium structure, (iii) Belgian or foreign non-financial groups.
Major shareholder categories Number of banks Percentage of banks Percentage of total assets
Foreign financial group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 39.3 17.7
Belgian financial group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 19.7 21.4
Listed banks with no shareholder owning more than 50 p.c. . . 2 3.3 56.6
Family structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 16.4 2.5
Professional credit associations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 14.8 0.4
Other (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.6 1.4
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 100.0 100.0103
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Box 3  –  Technologies separating cash-ﬂ  ow rights from voting rights
The trust ofﬁ  ce
One mechanism, frequently used in the Netherlands to separate cash-ﬂ  ow rights from voting rights is the trust 
ofﬁ  ce (“administratiekantoor”). A trust ofﬁ  ce holds the original shares of the company and issues “depository 
certiﬁ  cates”. Certiﬁ   cate holders, in addition to receiving dividends, retain the right to attend and speak at 
shareholders’ meetings, but they generally have no voting rights. Instead, the votes are cast by the trust ofﬁ  ce. 
Depending on its exact implementation, it may also serve as a mechanism to give real control to managers rather 
than shareholders. Trust ofﬁ  ces very often represent large shareholders (if not all).
Often, trust ofﬁ  ces serve as anti-take-over defences. As the supervisory board appoints the board members of the 
trust ofﬁ  ce and as the shareholders cannot exert their voting rights, it becomes impossible to take control of the 
ﬁ  rm through a hostile take-over. This mechanism also limits shareholder power and ensures managerial autonomy. 
On the other hand, the trust ofﬁ  ce has a lot of power and if it actually acts in the interest of (a subgroup of) 
shareholders, these are very well represented, whether they attend the shareholder meeting or not. This is in 
contrast with ﬁ  rms where uncast votes are handed over to the management.
When looking at the Netherlands, it seems that trust ofﬁ  ces have been effective in protecting banks from foreign 
hostile take-overs without preventing company growth. These days however, the trend, at least in banking, is to 
gradually eliminate this Dutch peculiarity and to give more power to shareholders.  (1)
Preference shares
Preference shares constitute another widely used device. Unlike the trust ofﬁ  ce, preference shares do not increase 
the power of management, but affect the balance of power among shareholders. Preference shares may have 
several special features regarding dividend, seniority and voting rights. For example, the preference shares used 
by ABN-Amro give a right to a ﬁ  xed guaranteed dividend of 5.5 p.c. of the face value, are senior to ordinary 
shares (but junior to debt) upon liquidation, and carry multiple voting rights. Hence, with respect to their pay-
off, preference shares resemble subordinated debt. They differ solely in their attached voting rights and their 
indeterminate maturity. Hence, the use of dual-class shares is a way to endow some shareholders with incentives 
that are more debt-like.
ABN Amro uses preference shares accounting for 2.7 p.c. of the market value of the equity of the bank but with 
47 p.c. of its voting rights. More than 80 p.c. of these preference shares are held by only 6 shareholders. This 
means that, together with the ordinary shares owned by these shareholders, 46 p.c. of the voting rights are in 
the hands of a group owning only 17 p.c. of the market value of the equity of the bank. Hence, ABN Amro has a 
(1)  ABN Amro announced its intention to dissolve its trust ofﬁ  ce (Stichting Administratiekantoor ABN AMRO Holding). The board of directors of ING proposed that the 
holders of depositary receipts obtain a voting proxy for the full number of their depositary receipts, whether it is “peacetime” or not. This means that Trust Ofﬁ  ce 
ING Shares will only exercise a vote at its own discretion for those depositary receipts the holders of which are not represented at the Annual General Meeting 
and who have not given any voting instruction to the Trust Ofﬁ  ce ING Shares. Yet, the second trust ofﬁ  ce of ING, Trust Ofﬁ  ce ING Continuity retains its call option 
which gives the trust ofﬁ  ce the right to acquire cumulative preference shares. Fortis also has this kind of trust ofﬁ  ce (Stichting Continuïteit Fortis) which has been 
granted an option to acquire a number of Fortis preference shares. These two trust ofﬁ  ces should be considered as anti-take-over devices. In order to prevent a 
hostile take-over, the trust is only given an option to buy cumulative preference shares in case of “wartime”. This so-called “poison pill” does not limit the power of 
shareholders in “peacetime”.
  signiﬁ  cantly exceed cash-ﬂ  ow rights may distort incentives 
to the disadvantage of small investors. Bebchuk et al. 
(1999) show that this may cause considerable agency 
costs. Neither proxy contests nor hostile take-overs are 
possible, limiting the discipline of the external market and 
raising moral hazard concerns.
This analysis demonstrates that there is no clear answer 
to the question whether the RSA should favour dispersed 
or concentrated bank ownership. To some extent, there 
is an underlying trade-off between stable ownership and 
managerial autonomy, a trade-off that, as section 4 will 
show, the RSA in Belgium has tried to balance by intro-
ducing a special supervisory agreement.
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dispersed ownership, with concentrated voting rights.  (2) The ﬁ  gures are presented in Table 3.1, which details the 
major shareholders’ investment and the attached voting rights.
Until now however, ABN Amro has combined these preference shares with a trust ofﬁ  ce which made management 
quite independent of these shareholders. In its 2002 annual report, ABN Amro announced its intention to change 
on this front, as with the trust ofﬁ  ce. The bank is planning to purchase all outstanding preference shares. This is 
because pressure from current corporate governance practice for non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms discourages the use of dual 
class shares as it limits transparency. This measure will be accompanied by the dissolution of the trust ofﬁ  ce. From 
an RSA point of view, however, these dual class shares may in some cases be favoured, especially if they lead to 
stable shareholders with incentives that are closer to those of debt holders.
Pyramid structure
Pyramid structures represent an alternative to dual-class shares that also increases block-holder power without 
changing income rights. In a pyramid of two companies, consider a controlling shareholder holding a controlling 
stake (s1) in a holding company that, in turn holds a controlling stake (s2) in an operating company. Assume 
one-share-one-vote and assume ﬁ  rst that it takes si > 0.5 (i = 1,2) to exert control over the assets. Then, the 
fraction of cash-ﬂ  ow rights required to gain formal control is only s1s2 > 0.25. With a cascade of n ﬁ  rms, control 









where α  is equal to the cash-ﬂ  ow rights held by the controlling shareholder
si represents the fraction of shares of ﬁ  rm i held by the controlling shareholder.
(2)  However, it should be noted that in normal circumstances (i.e. peace time), as one ordinary share requires a signiﬁ  cantly larger investment than one preference 
share, holders of depositary receipts for preference shares have the opportunity to acquire voting rights in the meeting of shareholders by proxy only, in proportion 
to the economic value of a preference share against that of an ordinary share. In addition, the trust ofﬁ  ce of ABN AMRO holding will exercise the voting rights in 
respect of preference shares for which no proxies have been issued.
TABLE 3.1 CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF ABN AMRO
(Market value on December 31, 2003)
Source: ABN Amro Annual Report 2003.
Ordinary shares Preference shares Total




Aegon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 13.5 0.7 6.5
Fortis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 15.7 0.9 7.7
Delta loyd  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 9.9 1.0 5.0
ING  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 17.6 8.6 12.7
Rabobank  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 10.6 0.4 5.0
Zonnewijzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 14.2 0.4 6.7
Capital Group International, Inc. . . . . . . . . 5.2 0.0 5.1 2.8
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 81.6 17.0 46.3
Other shareholders  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.8 18.4 83.0 53.7
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In the past, pyramid structures were common in Belgium. The shareholding structure of BBL, before it was 
acquired by ING, was an example of such structure. BBL was controlled by three shareholders acting jointly : Crédit 
Communal/Gemeentekrediet (12.5 p.c.), GBL (12.5 p.c.) and Royale Belge (12.5 p.c.).  (3) The other shareholders 
included ING (20 p.c.) and Winterthur (8.2 p.c.). Although the shareholders were acting jointly, the control was 
mainly exercised by GBL.(4) GBL in turn was controlled by the Family Holding Frère-Bourgeois through a cascade 
of companies.(5)
A current rather a-typical example in the Belgian ﬁ  nancial sector is KBC holding, as it emerged in 1998 out of the 
merger of KB Bank, Cera Bank and ABB insurance. KBC holding, which is listed on Euronext, is 70 p.c. controlled 
by Almanij, another listed ﬁ  nancial holding company, which in turn is more than 70 p.c. controlled by a group 
of major shareholders. Among these shareholders there is another listed ﬁ  nancial holding company, Almancora 
holding 28 p.c. of the shares of Almanij.(6) Almancora is 80 p.c. owned by Cera.
Cross ownership
The use of cross ownership to increase voting power is explained in the following ﬁ  gure.
In this symmetrical two company case, the controlling shareholder has a direct fraction of S shares, large enough to 
control both ﬁ  rms. Both companies have a cross-holding h. The indirect shareholding for the shareholder in each ﬁ  rm 
becomes S + h. The controller’s fraction of the cash ﬂ  ow right (µ) is the ratio of its holding S over the total fraction of 
shares that is not cross-held (1-h) : µ = S/(1-h). For any µ it is in theory possible to set up a cross-ownership structure 
such that the controller has formal control over the assets but no more than a fraction µ of cash-ﬂ  ow rights.
In the ﬁ  nancial sector, cross-holdings are commonplace. For example, Fortis currently directly owns 7.7 p.c. of the voting 
rights in ABN Amro and an interest of between 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. in ING. ING has a direct participation in ABN Amro 
representing 12.7 p.c. of the voting rights, while ABN Amro holds 5 p.c. to 10 p.c. in ING. Indirectly, Fortis has thus more 
power over ING and ABN Amro than would be expected from the direct shareholdings. This calls for two remarks. First, 
from what was discussed previously, we know that voting rights attached to ABN and ING shares are handed over to a 
trust-ofﬁ  ce. Because of this, the power of Fortis is limited. Second, Fortis is not a controlling shareholder in ING nor in 
ABN Amro. This means that Fortis has only partial control over the shares held in the cross-holding between ING and 
FIGURE 3.1  CROSS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Controlling
shareholder





(3)  The ultimate owner of Royale Belge was Royale Vendôme (52 p.c.), partly owned by UAP (75 p.c.) and GBL (25 p.c.).
(4)  See e.g. Delvaux and Michielsen (1999).
(5)  In 1995, GBL was controlled by Pargesa Holding (47.4 p.c.) which in turn was controlled by Parjointco (55 p.c.). Parjointco was jointly controlled by Power 
Corporation (a Canadian holding company controlled by Paul Desmarais, owning 50 p.c. of the shares of Parjointco) and by Agesca Nederland (50 p.c.). Agesca 
Nederland was controlled by the Compagnie Nationale à Portefeuille/Nationale Portefeuille Maatschappij (89.5 p.c.). The Compagnie Nationale à Portefeuille/
Nationale Portefeuille Maatschappij was controlled by Fibelpar (46.2 p.c.) which in turn was controlled by Erbe (54.1 p.c.) which was controlled by the Family Holding 
Frère Bourgeois (54.5 p.c.). For more information, see e.g. Chapelle and Szafarz (2002) or Becht et al. (2001).
(6)  Almancora, was set up after a legal dispute, in order to allow mutual shareholders of Cera holding, a cooperative and formerly the owner of Cera Bank, to make 
their stakes in Cera more liquid by converting them into Almancora shares.
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3.3  Structure of the board of directors
Voting rights in the general meeting of shareholders are 
not the sole source of power. Inﬂ  uence in the board is 
important too. Of course, voting rights and inﬂ  uence in 
the board are related. However, the power of the board 
over the ﬁ  rm’s decisions may differ, depending on the 
board structure, i.e. the number of independent, execu-
tive and non-executive members, shareholder representa-
tives, appointment procedures, committees, nomination 
period, etc. Box 4 presents some evidence on the current 
functioning of boards of directors in Belgium.
The monitoring function of the board is especially 
important for banks, where monitoring by depositors 
is non-existent. The complexity of operations impedes 
monitoring by those sparce, uninsured creditors, and 
banking regulation often makes take-overs (and thus 
market discipline) more difﬁ  cult. In addition, one can also 
argue that the role of the board is different from its role 
in non-banking organisations. Normally, the board acts in 
the interest of the shareholders. Besides the fact that this 
is a legal obligation, this can also be justiﬁ  ed by the fact 
that shareholders are the only stakeholders that can cred-
ibly contract with the other stakeholders, as they have 
the strongest incentives at the margin (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1983). In banks, however, shareholders cannot 
credibly commit to an implicit contract with debt hold-
ers. As the latter are not represented, shareholders will 
not internalise the interests of debt holders. (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003). A solution may be to give bank boards of 
directors ﬁ  duciary duties not only towards   shareholders 
but also towards debt holders. Hence, bank boards should 
comprise more independent members and fewer repre-
sentatives of the shareholders. Bank directors should also 
receive less equity-based compensation. The latter idea   
is conﬁ  rmed by Becher, Campbell and Frye (2003). They 
compare a sample of 700 observations from 81 US banks 
with 13147 observations from non-banks over the period 
1992-1999. They ﬁ  nd that, on average, bank directors’ 
remuneration consists of 18.72  p.c. equity-based pay 
compared to 31 p.c. for non-bank directors. This differ-
ence declines over the sample period.
Gillette et al. (2003) show that having a majority of independ-
ent board members (outsiders) is not enough to guarantee 
efﬁ  cient board performance. What also matters is the way in 
which board members consult each other. They simulate the 
functioning of a board of directors comprising insiders and 
outsiders in laboratory experiments with human subjects. 
Their experiments provide support for the hypothesis that 
boards dominated by outsiders tend to produce the out-
come which maximises ﬁ  rm value. In addition, allowing for 
communication between outsiders (whatever the commu-
nication protocol used), favours the adoption of the socially 
efﬁ   cient outcome. Hence, in order to foster efﬁ  ciency  (13), 
coordination between outsiders should be enhanced. This 
implies that boards where the outside members can consult 
one another in private will be more efﬁ  cient. This is an argu-
ment in favour of a two-tier board structure.
ABN Amro. Hence, there may be other reasons for these cross-holdings, e.g. strategic, ﬁ  nancial (in a bankinsurance 
model, cross ownership can also result from the investment portfolio of the insurance company. In that case, investments 
are not made for control purposes but may serve a strategic purpose), historical or cross-monitoring reasons. Yet the last 
reason could also present some drawbacks. Indeed, if a bank acquires a signiﬁ  cant participating interest in a competitor, 
and a seat on its board of directors in order to monitor that ﬁ  rm, this creates potential conﬂ  icts of interests which may 
in the end considerably weaken the role of the board and undermine its supervisory function.
(13) Efﬁ  ciency refers to the fact that decisions of the board pursue ﬁ  rm value 
maximisation
Box 4  –  Board structure of Belgian banks
Board composition
Table 4.1 presents the structure of the board of directors of several Belgian banks. A breakdown is made between 
executive and non-executive members. Among the non-executive members, we distinguish between independent 
and non-independent directors. This distinction is based on information provided in annual reports and is thus 
based on a self-assessment of each board of directors.
!107
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF BANKS
With regard to the board structure, there are some signiﬁ  cant differences among Belgian banks. There is no 
(implicit) rule with regard to the composition of the board or to the number of directors.  (1) The number of 
directors in Belgian banks ranges from 10 to 26. The number of independent directors also varies. The majority 
of directors in Fortis and Dexia are independent. In KBC, only a minority of the non-executive members are 
independent.
TABLE 4.1 COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SEVERAL BELGIAN BANKS
(Independence distinction is based on information provided in annual reports of banks and is thus based on a self-assessment of each board 
of directors)
Source: Annual Reports 2003 and Bankscope.
(1) On March 4, 2004, the board of directors of Dexia appointed Anne-Marie Idrac as a provisional replacement for Paul Louis Halley, who died on December 6, 2003. 
On December 31, 2003, there were thus 8 independent directors instead of 9.
(2) The board of directors of Fortis appointed 5 new non-executive directors in 2004, in replacement of 4 non-executive directors who had reached the end of their 
term of office. The board of directors of Fortis now counts 12 non-executive directors. Fortis also announced other changes including the replacement of the 
co-chairmanship structure by a single chairmanship and the end of the parity between Belgian and Dutch directors.
(3) December 2002.
(4) Chairman of the board of Directors at the bank level is CEO at the group level.
(5) Same chairman at the group and at the bank levels.




Non-executive members Total Separation
chairman / CEO?
independent not independent not classified
Listed
Dexia (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . Group 1 8 9 18 yes
Fortis (2)  . . . . . . . . . . . Group 1 11 12 yes
KBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Group 8 4 11 23 yes
Keytrade  . . . . . . . . . . Bank 4 7 11 yes
Non listed banking entity of listed Belgian financial group
Dexia . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bank 7 19 26 yes
Fortis (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . Bank 10 11 21 yes (4)
KBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bank 5 8 13 yes (5)
Not listed
Axa Belgium (3)   . . . . . Bank 6 7 13 yes
Banque Degroof  . . . . Bank 9 3 5 17 yes
HSBC – Dewaay   . . . . Bank 4 6 10 yes
Bank Delen  . . . . . . . . Bank 5 7 12 yes
ING Belgium (6)   . . . . . Bank 6 10 16 yes
(1)  Yet note that the Report of the Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance recommends limiting the size of board of a ﬁ  rm in general to no more than 
12 directors.
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The three large Belgian banks use a different deﬁ  nition of independence, although they all comply with the new 
legislative act of August 2002. Therefore, the ﬁ  gures in Table 4.1 are not totally comparable. KBC relies only on 
the deﬁ  nition of independence given in the Corporate Law. The board of directors of Fortis uses its own deﬁ  nition 
of independence. For instance, Fortis’ deﬁ  nition of independence does not take account of a maximum term of 
ofﬁ  ce. Banque Degroof used the recommendations of Euronext Brussels.  (2) Finally, Dexia uses criteria that are even 
more stricter than those of the Bouton White Paper  (3) and the Belgian Corporate Governance Law. This illustrates 
how difﬁ  cult it is to deﬁ  ne independence.  (4)
TABLE 4.2 COMPOSITION OF COMMITTEES OF KBC, DEXIA AND FORTIS (GROUP LEVEL)
Source: Annual Report 2003.
Committees Fortis Dexia KBC
Audit Composition: 6 independent 
board members. Meetings in 
2003:5.
Composition: 4 board members 
(two of whom are independent). 
Meetings in 2003:4.
Composition: 9 non executive 
board members (3 of whom 




1 appointment and 
compensation committee 
consisting of 7 board members, 
including 6 independent board 
members and the CEO. Meetings 
in 2003:3.
Composition: 6 board members 
(comprising the Chairman, the 
CEO and 2 independent 
directors). Meetings in 2003:4.




Composition: 3 non-executive 
directors (the Chairman and 
2 independent directors). 
Meetings in 2003:2.
Composition: 3 non-executive 
directors (including 
1 independent director and 
2 representatives of the principal 
shareholder). The committee 
meets on an ad hoc basis.
Strategy NA Composition: 6 board members 
(comprising the Chairman, the 
CEO and 2 independent 
directors). Meetings in 2003:1.
NA
Agenda NA NA Composition: 6 members 
(including the Chaiman of the 
board, the President and Vice-
President of the executive 
committee and 3 non-executive 
directors). The committee meets 
prior to each Board meeting.
Risk and Capital Composition: 5 board members 




(2)  Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance (1998), Report.
(3) MEDEF,  “Pour un meilleur gouvernement des entreprises cotées : rapport du groupe de travail présidé par Daniel Bouton, président de la Société Générale”, 
September 2002.
(4)  Criteria for independence refer to directors with no ties with shareholders or managers. The latter criterion tend to be emphasised in the Anglo-saxon corporate 
governance model relying upon dispersed shareholder, the former is more relevant for the Continental corporate governance model with concentrated ownership. 
Although there is no single deﬁ  nition of independence, it is at least possible to identify some dependence criteria. The list of criteria given here is based on the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code (Corporate Governance Committee, “The Dutch Corporate Governance Code : principles of good corporate governance and 
best practices provisions”, December 2003. This report is also known as the Tabaksblat report) and on the Bouton White Paper. They combine both criteria from 
the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental model. A director may not be considered as independent if one of the following criteria applies to him, his wife, or child or 
relative up to the second degree :109
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4.   A special supervisory instrument : 
The agreement on the autonomy of 
bank management
The fact that the agency conﬂ  ict in banks differs from the 
agency conﬂ  ict in non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms creates a need for an 
RSA. The exercise of the RSA function is facilitated by sound 
corporate governance structures in banks. Therefore, the 
RSA may try to govern the relationships between sharehold-
ers, directors and managers. The Belgian supervisory model 
makes use of an original instrument to govern these relation-
ships  : the Agreement on the autonomy of bank manage-
ment. To the best of our knowledge, this instrument is rather 
speciﬁ  c to Belgium. First, the instrument itself is original, in 
the Belgian tradition of developing rules and regulations by 
way of soft law. Supervisory intervention served mainly as a 
substitute for formal regulation and formed a body of infor-
mal company law aimed at policing the conduct of major 
companies (see e.g. Wymeersch, 1994). Second, the content 
of the agreement is not necessarily included in the legislative 
framework of neighbouring countries.  (14)
Although the stated purpose of the autonomy agreement 
is to guarantee the stability and the continuity of the 
banking function, the historical background lends itself to 
a more limited interpretation (for an historical overview of 
the agreement on the autonomy of bank management, 
see Appendix 1). Indeed, the agreement on the autonomy 
of bank management has its roots in the desire to avoid 
conﬂ   icts of interests within group structures (in mixed 
banks or in industrial holding companies). As structural 
regulation failed to fully solve conﬂ   icts of interests in 
credit policy, the CB  (15) started to negotiate agreements 
with bank shareholders to ensure the independence of 
bank management in credit policy. As such, it focused 
on credit risk and did not target the general problem 
At the bank level, managers seem to have an important say in the board. This is because the Agreement on the 
autonomy of bank management stipulates that members of the managing board must be chosen from among the 
members of the board of directors. (5) Executives, however, may not be in the majority. In addition, the total number of 
board members seems to be quite large. This might raise difﬁ  culties in board decision-making, as there may be moral 
hazard in teams. Therefore, it is important to establish subcommittees. This is addressed in the next paragraph.
Board organisation
The board of directors may delegate some of its responsibilities to committees made up of a limited number of 
directors. Table 4.2 summarises committees created by Dexia, KBC and Fortis. There is no universal deﬁ  nition 
of the scope of competencies of each of these committees. The prerogatives of the committee and its members 
are determined at the board level.
All the banks represented in the table make use of several speciﬁ  c committees. It seems that there are large 
differences in board structure between banks. An audit committee and a remuneration committee are nowadays 
commonplace in a lot of ﬁ  rms across many industries. Yet, their composition varies widely. For instance, the audit 
committee of Dexia contains 4 members but 9 members in the KBC case. The existence of a strategy committee 
or a risk and capital committee is maybe less frequent. Codes of best practices recommend that the board of 
directors establish rules that deﬁ  ne the roles and responsibilities of each of these committees. With regard to 
the composition of the audit committee, the Bouton White Paper recommends that, if such a committee exists, 
it should comprise at least two-thirds independent members and no current or former managers. In addition, 
members of the committee should be ﬁ  nance or accounting experts. The audit committee should supervise the 
internal control, the internal and external audits, and check compliance with their recommendations.
The Bouton report deﬁ  nes the optimal composition of the remuneration committee. The committee should comprise 
a majority of independent members and no executive directors. The remuneration committee should make proposals 
with regard to the remuneration package of directors, members of the managing board and high level employees of 
the ﬁ  rm. A crucial element of this package is the importance of the variable element (cf. supra).
(14)  One should, however, note that the Italian legislation contains a provision 
pointing out that the Bank of Italy may request a sort of “declaration of 
independence” from the participants in the capital of a new bank in the 
occasion of its setting up (see also Lombardo, 1993).
(15)  The Commission for Banking (CB), the Belgian RSA, was set up in 1935. In 
1990, it was renamed the Commission for Banking and Finance (CBF). In 
2003, the CBF merged with the OCA/CDV, the agency in charge of the control 
of insurance companies, to form the Commission for Banking, Finance and 
Insurance (CBFA). The text thus uses the abbreviations CB, CBF and CBFA, 
depending on the period it is referring to.
(5)  Note that the agreement applies at the bank level and not at the group level. Therefore, we see that banks such as Fortis or Dexia only have one executive member 
on the group board while the whole managing committee is represented at the bank level.110
of   banking risk. To this end, the agreement establishes 
a clear distinction between the managing board of a 
bank and its board of directors. In addition, it tries to 
reinforce the independence of a bank’s management and 
to protect it from any external inﬂ  uence.  (16) The goal of 
this section is to present this special and unique feature 
of the Belgian supervisory model, i.e. the agreement on 
the autonomy of bank management.  (17) This subsection 
ﬁ   rst retraces the tradition of autonomy agreements in 
Belgium. Subsequently, it investigates the future for a 
(revised) autonomy agreement.
4.1  The Belgian autonomy agreement
The current agreement rests on two pillars. Its ﬁ  rst pillar 
is based on a clear distinction between management and 
supervision :
– The managing board is in sole charge of the banking 
function and should pursue the interests of the bank 
to the fullest. The managing board manages the credit 
institution according to the general policy deﬁ  ned at 
the board of directors’ level. The managing board is 
composed of members of the board of directors and 
constitutes a collegial body.
– Supervision of the management is the prerogative of 
the board of directors. The latter also deﬁ  nes the gen-
eral policy of the bank and has the power to appoint 
and dismiss members of the managing board. The 
scope of the general policy includes planning, budgets, 
important structural reforms, and relationships between 
the bank and its shareholders.
The second pillar of the agreement speciﬁ  es the rights and 
duties of signiﬁ  cant shareholders.  (18) First, the agreement 
clearly states that, despite their speciﬁ  c  role,  signiﬁ  cant 
shareholders have the right to expect a normal return on 
their investment. In addition, they are actively represented 
in the board of directors and subsequently play a role in the 
deﬁ  nition of the general policy and the supervision of the 
bank. Signiﬁ  cant shareholders, however, may not use their 
inﬂ  uence to interfere with the business management. They 
also undertake to support the credit institution, to guaran-
tee its stability and to ensure the autonomy of its manage-
ment. They agree to inform the managing board, the board 
of directors and the CBFA prior to any changes in the size 
of their participating interest. The CBFA may recommend 
suspending the disposal operation for a period of three 
months if this operation threatens the stability of the bank 
or the independence of its management or if shares are 
transferred to an unsuitable shareholder.(19) Table 1 provides 
a summary of the content of the agreement. The informa-
tion presented in Table  1 is based on a standard agreement 
on the autonomy of bank management. However, the 
agreement provides that any party may request a modiﬁ  ca-
tion of the agreement, although the modiﬁ  cation needs to 
be accepted by all the other parties (including the CBFA) 
and by the shareholders meeting.
Each bank ratiﬁ  es voluntarily the agreement after negotia-
tions with the CBFA. One of the incentives that the bank-
ing industry may ﬁ  nd to ratify the agreement is to avoid 
the development of a formal one-size-ﬁ  ts-all legislation 
containing the provisions of the agreement.(20)
The agreement is essentially a compromise that tries 
to combine the advantages of a stable shareholder 
structure with the advantages of autonomous man-
agement. Section 3 showed that there is typically a 
trade-off between the existence of a reference share-
holder and managerial autonomy. The agreement thus 
tries to impose management autonomy in every share-
holder structure by limiting the intervention of share-
holders in the management of the bank. It ensures the 
autonomy of the banking function by the introduction 
of a structure similar to a two-tier board of directors. 
Instead of structurally breaking up the group, it intro-
duces a governance solution reminiscent of Chinese 
walls. In addition, through its second pillar, the agree-
ment tries to ensure stability of ownership by placing 
restrictions on the disposal of shares. Indirectly, restric-
tions on the sale of shares also constitute recognition 
that concentrated ownership provides more stability and 
hence better protection for parties that have contractual 
relationships, such as depositors. The agreement thus 
implies an uneasy compromise, as signiﬁ  cant  share-
holders have to give up control and at the same time 
accept additional responsibilities, such as supporting 
(16)  This, however, also results in a great need for internal and external control, 
as the monitoring function of shareholders is weakened. Banks are therefore 
subject to a cascade of control. This cascade of control is often symbolised 
by four concentric circles. The inner circle represents the internal control, the 
second circle, the internal audit, the third circle the external audit and the outer 
circle the CBFA. Note that the role of the external auditor and the nature of the 
auditor’s contact with the supervisory authority are rather special in Belgium. 
The external auditor function in fact combines a private mandate (deﬁ  ned in 
the corporate law – this mandate relates to the protection of shareholders) 
and a public mandate (co-operation with the CBFA – this mission relates to the 
protection of debt holders). The co-operation with the supervisory authority not 
only encompasses a signalling function (i.e. the auditor reports directly to the 
CBFA any decisions, facts or developments that could signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uence the 
position of the credit institution or that are in conﬂ  ict with corporate law, with 
the articles of association or the banking law) but also a supervisory function 
based on compliance forms. The auditor must thus perform a number of 
additional tests for a supervisory purpose.
(17)  A similar agreement, the agreement on the autonomy of insurance 
management, also exists for the insurance industry. This instrument resulted 
from negotiations between the CDV-OCA and insurance companies.
(18)  Note that there is no formal deﬁ  nition of a signiﬁ  cant shareholder. The 
agreement speciﬁ  es that “insofar as the voting rights attached to a participating 
interest may have a de facto inﬂ  uence on [general] shareholders’ meetings, 
such a participating interest will imply an institutional role for the shareholders 
concerned, a role which, considering the powers they have, imposes 
corresponding duties to support the credit institution’s stability, development 
and autonomy”.
(19)  However, the agreement does not deﬁ  ne “unsuitable shareholders”.
(20)  Yet, although the banking industry as a whole has an interest in the approval 
of agreements, this is not the case for each of the signiﬁ  cant shareholders of 
individual banks of the system. Therefore, it opens the door to free-riding types 
of behaviour, in which some banks might decide to refuse to negotiate the 
agreement.111
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TABLE 1 CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE AUTONOMY OF BANK MANAGEMENT
Managing Board Board of Directors Shareholders
Role The managing board is responsible 
for the business management of 
the credit institution. This 
management is to be carried out 
without external interference in the 
context of the general policy laid 
down by the board of directors.
The board of directors confers on 
the managing board powers to 
take decisions and represent the 
bank with regard to its staff, its 
customers, other credit institutions, 
other economic and social entities 
and the authorities. The CBFA is to 
be consulted with regard to the 
scope of powers delegated to the 
managing board.
The managing board will constitute 
a collective body with collective 
responsibility.
The board of directors defines the 
general policy (on its own initiative 
or following a proposal by the 
managing board). The general 
policy includes the definition of the 
bank’s strategic direction, the 
approval of plans and budgets, 
significant structural changes and 
restructuring, and the definition of 
relationships between the credit 
institution and its shareholders.
The board of directors exercises 
effective supervision over the 
management and the business. To 
this end, the managing board and 
the external auditor regularly 
report to the board of directors. In 
addition, the board has a right of 
investigation. The board may call 
upon the assistance of an audit 
committee consisting of directors 
who are not members of the 
managing board.
The chairman of the board of 
directors will ensure that powers 
are correctly distributed between 
the board of directors and the 
managing board.
Significant shareholders undertake 
to support the credit institution, to 
guarantee its stability, to ensure 
the autonomy of its management 
and to create the conditions 
necessary for ensuring sound, 
objective and prudent 
management of the bank. They 
accept that the bank is not merely 
an instrument for serving their own 
interest, but also has other 
interests which must be taken into 
account in banking.
They undertake not to vote during 
the general meeting for the 
removal from office or the non-
renewal of the director’s mandate 
of a member of the managing 
board or of the chairman of the 
board of directors without having 
sought the opinion of the board of 
directors and the managing board 
and the approval of the CBFA.
They play an active role within the 
board of directors in defining the 
general policy, supervising its 
activities and management, and 
appointing the members of the 
management committee.
They communicate the size of their 
participating interest each year to 
the CBFA and the board of 
directors.
Composition Members of the managing board 
must be under 65 and must have 
the required professional integrity 
and experience.
The managing board is composed 
of members of the board of 
directors. After consultation of its 
board, the chairman of the 
managing board must advise the 
chairman of the board of directors 
of the candidates proposed for 
nomination as chairman and as 
members of the managing board. If 
the chairman of the board of 
directors approves the proposal, he 
submits it to the board of directors. 
Otherwise he makes a counter-
proposal to the chairman of the 
managing board. If the managing 
board disagrees, both chairmen try 
to reach a consensus on a single 
candidate. Otherwise, each 
chairman submits his proposal to 
the board of directors. The approval 
of the CBFA is required before any 
proposal to the board of directors.
The board of directors may decide 
whether to revoke or not to renew 
the mandate of a member of the 
managing board only after 
obtaining the opinion of the 
managing board and of the CBFA.
The board of directors ensures that 
shareholders’ interests are 
adequately represented and 
includes the members of the 
management board. The board 
may have a majority of 
representatives from those 
shareholders who have signed the 
agreement.
Members of the managing board 
may not form a majority on the 
board of directors.
Independent directors may also be 
appointed as directors in order to 
diversify the composition of the 
board.
The credit institution ensures that 
the number of directors is limited.
The chairman of the board of 
directors is appointed by the board 
of directors from among those 
directors who are not members of 
the managing board. The CBFA is 
to be consulted beforehand on the 
appointment and departure of the 
chairman of the board of directors. 
The appointment and removal 
from office of the chairman of the 
board of directors is subject to the 
prior approval of the CBFA.
In order to protect the credit 
institution’s autonomy, 
arrangements are to be made to 
prevent an unsuitable shareholder 
from acquiring a significant 
participating interest in the credit 
institution. Any change which 
would directly or indirectly result in 
a significant increase or decrease in 
the relative size of the participating 
interest of a significant shareholder 
is subject to the opinion of the 
board of directors and the 
managing board of the credit 
institution and to prior consultation 
with the CBFA. If such change 
would be likely to affect the 
stability or the autonomy of the 
institution, the CBFA may 
recommend implementation to be 
suspended for a maximum of three 
months. This recommendation may 
be made public.112
the credit institution and guaranteeing its stability. Yet, 
shareholders can still exert inﬂ  uence through the board 
of directors. This inﬂ  uence is limited, as the prerogatives 
of the board of directors are restricted to the deﬁ  nition 
of the general policy and the supervision of the bank. 
Managing the bank is the exclusive competence of the 
managing board and must be carried out without any 
external interference, in the context of the general policy 
deﬁ  ned at the board level. So, solving the ﬁ  rst agency 
problem (i.e. the potential abuses by controlling share-
holders) may result in reintroducing another problem of 
governance, namely, the separation of ownership and 
management.
4.2  What future for an autonomy agreement ?
The agreement on the autonomy of bank management 
is a special instrument to be situated between regula-
tion and corporate governance codes. However, due to 
this special position, the agreement is challenged as, on 
the one hand, bank regulation has changed and, on the 
other hand, the corporate world is increasingly focus-
ing on governance codes. More importantly, structural 
changes in the banking landscape might call for changes 
in the agreement. We discuss here the emergence of 
ﬁ  nancial conglomerates, the move towards foreign and 
dispersed ownership, and the changes in regulation. 
These all have an effect on the functioning of the agree-
ment on the autonomy of bank management.
4.2.1   Bank ownership after the merger wave of the 90‘s
The ownership structure of Belgian bank holding compa-
nies has considerably evolved over the last 20 years. This 
may call into question the efﬁ  ciency and the usefulness 
of the autonomy agreement. First, compared to 1974, 
when the agreement was applied to 50 banks, sharehold-
ing structures of bank holdings seem to be less stable, 
as changes in ownership structure are becoming more 
frequent in Belgium (see e.g. the M&A waves of the 90’s). 
However, the stability of the ownership structure is essen-
tial for the effective application of the agreement. Too 
frequent signiﬁ  cant changes in the ownership structure 
might become difﬁ   cult to manage, as each signiﬁ  cant 
change in ownership composition demands a renegotia-
tion of the agreement. Second, we observe that the tra-
ditional industrial holding group structure, as well as the 
pyramid structure, are tending to disappear. Several large 
Belgian banks are now owned by foreign ﬁ  nancial groups 
with a more dispersed ownership structure  (21), although 
large differences still persist (see Box 2). In principle, 
dispersed ownership increases the power of managers, 
while foreign owners may be difﬁ   cult to control. This 
changes the nature of agency conﬂ  icts and subsequently 
decreases the need for the ﬁ  rst pillar of the agreement, 
while the second pillar becomes more important.
4.2.2 Banking  structures
While the former industrial holding structure was disap-
pearing, another structure emerged, namely the ﬁ  nancial 
conglomerate structure, combining banking, insurance 
and securities activities (National Bank of Belgium, 2002). 
At the top of the conglomerate is the ﬁ  nancial holding 
company, which is often listed. The holding company may 
Remuneration The board of directors sets the 
remuneration of the managing 
board, after seeking the opinion of 
the chairman of the managing 
board. The remuneration covers all 
functions performed by the 
members of the managing board 
within the credit institution, 
including their functions and 
mandates in companies where the 
credit institution has a participating 
interest.
Where this remuneration includes a 
variable element, it may not be 
calculated on the basis of items 
classified as operating expenses.
The allocation of remuneration 
among members of the managing 
board is subject to internal rules 
approved by the board of directors.
The remuneration of the board of 
directors consists solely of 
attendance fees or fixed 
remuneration, to be decided upon 
by the general meeting and, where 
appropriate, an annual fee laid 
down in the credit institution’s 
articles of association based on the 
dividend paid or a portion thereof.
The particular role of the 
shareholders in no way impairs 
their right to expect the credit 
institution’s management to 
generate a normal return on their 
investment.
(21)  At the holding company level.113
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have a banking statute, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Each sector of activity is placed under a subsidiary. The 
subsidiaries are not listed, but are owned by the holding 
company. Hence, the bank has a concentrated ownership, 
while the holding company may have a dispersed owner-
ship (see Box 2).
The introduction of this structure changes the nature of 
the conﬂ  ict of interests. The main sources of conﬂ  icts of 
interests in these structures are no longer the relation-
ships between majority and minority shareholders but 
the contagion between several sectors of activity and 
the consequences for the claimholders of the institution. 
Indeed, risks taken in one sector of activity (e.g. insurance) 
can inﬂ  uence another sector of activity (e.g. banking), and 
vice-versa. This may lead to the cross-subsidisation of one 
category of claimholders (e.g. insurance policy holders) by 
another category (e.g. bank depositors). Hence, although 
the conglomerate structure may improve risk manage-
ment and efﬁ  ciency, it reintroduces the risk of contagion 
between the different sectors of activity. In this context, 
it also changes the problem of the RSA. In particular, it 
raises the question of what would happen if the ﬁ  nancial 
conglomerate comprised a weak insurance activity and 
a strong bank, and how would it be possible to protect 
bank debt holders in that situation. Increased transpar-
ency of the structure of the conglomerate and of the 
ﬂ  ows between sectors of activity is in any case needed. 
In addition, particular attention should be paid to general 
risk policy, as the risk of contagion depends on how the 
general risk policy (and not only the credit risk policy) is 
conducted.
Risk policy may be deﬁ  ned at the level of the sector of 
activity. This is especially the case when the subsidiar-
ies operate at arm’s length in relation to the holding 
company. In that case, each business line deﬁ  nes  and 
manages its own risk plan. Consequently, the risk of the 
conglomerate is the combination of the separate risk 
plans of the sectors of activity. Yet, there is a tendency 
to deﬁ  ne and manage risk at the group level in order to 
beneﬁ  t from synergies and diversiﬁ  cation effects.  (22) How 
does the autonomy agreement cope with this trend  ? 
Currently, two separate agreements are concluded at the 
bank level and at the insurance company level, ensuring 
that the management of both the bank and the   insurance 
company are   independent (from each other and from 
their direct and indirect shareholders). Therefore, risk 
management remains the competence of the managing 
board of the bank or insurance company, whereas the 
board of directors may only deﬁ  ne the general risk policy 
and supervise risk management. However, when the risk 
policy is deﬁ  ned at the group level, one might question 
the actual level of autonomy of the bank/insurance 
management.  (23) On the other hand, is the autonomy of 
bank  /  insurance management desirable or is it better to 
allow risk management at the holding company level  ? It 
is also interesting to note that the agreement does not 
impose restrictions on the management of the holding 
company, whereas a lot of decisions are made at the hold-
ing company level. This may create the need for a special 
agreement at the holding company level. It must also be 
noted that the present regulation imposes separate regu-
lations on the different sectors of activity.(24)
4.2.3 Legislative  developments
Some rules of the autonomy agreement are now covered 
by several legislative acts. At the Belgian level, one can cite, 
for instance, the Banking Law of 22 March 1993, the law 
of 3 May 2002 implemented by the Royal Decree of 19 July 
2002 concerning the exercise of external functions by direc-
tors and managers of credit institutions  (25) and the Law of 
2 August 2002 on corporate governance ; at the European 
level, the new European Company Statutes regulation, 
and the European Directive on Financial Conglomerates.  (26) 
Following these new developments, one could ask whether 
some elements of the agreement are not redundant, or 
worse, incompatible with current regulations.  (27)
With regard to the ﬁ  rst pillar of the agreement, article  26 
of the banking law authorises (but does not oblige) the 
board of directors to delegate some of its competences 
to a managing board constituted by directors. However, 
if such delegation occurs, the deﬁ  nition of the general 
policy of the bank must remain the responsibility of the 
board of directors. The corporate governance law adds 
that, if a managing board is constituted, the supervi-
sion of this managing board is the task of the board of 
(22)  E.g. traditionally, the duration of a bank’s assets is longer than the duration 
of its liabilities. The reverse is traditionally true for insurance companies. The 
interest rate risk of the insurance business is then negatively related to the 
interest rate risk of the bank business. See also National Bank of Belgium 
(2002).
(23)  A similar problem arises in the relationships between a daughter company 
and its parent company when both are subject to the agreement on bank 
management autonomy, and raises the issue of consolidated prudential control. 
Indeed, the fact that the management of a daughter is autonomous does not 
exempt it from adhering to the strategy of its parent as regards risk control and 
management or internal audit. Conversely, the agreement on the autonomy 
of bank management may not be used by the bank parent company to gain 
exemption from any kind of control or responsibility.
(24)  There has recently been some tendency towards convergence in the regulation 
of banks and insurance activities, although it is limited to regulatory techniques 
for capital requirements. This requires the co-ordinated supervision of banks and 
insurance companies. The move from CBF-OCA / CDV to CBFA can be seen in 
this light.
(25)  To guarantee the separation of the managing and supervisory functions, non-
executive directors may not hold executive functions in companies in which the 
bank has an interest.
(26)  Directive 2002 / 87/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment ﬁ  rms in a ﬁ  nancial conglomerate.
(27)  For instance, this is particularly true with regard to sanctions and arbitration. 
The legislation generally punishes an infringement by a sanction, while for the 
same infringement the agreement will favour consultation and arbitration (this 
is of course due to the characteristics of this instrument).114
  directors.  (28) Note here that, very clearly, the agreement 
on the autonomy of bank management sets up a stricter 
organisation and division of powers. In addition, arti-
cles 18 and 19 of the banking law stipulate that direc-
tors and members of the managing board must have the 
required professional integrity and experience, although 
the law does not establish any ex ante control by the 
CBFA. The Royal Decree of July 2002 also stipulates some 
incompatibilities in the exercise of external functions by 
the director or the manager of a bank.
With regard to the second pillar of the agreement, 
articles 17 and 24 of the banking law stipulate that the 
identity of shareholders owning more than 5 p.c. of the 
shares must be communicated to the CBFA in order to 
obtain a bank licence. Afterwards, communication is 
mandatory if the shareholding structure is modiﬁ  ed. The 
CBFA has the right to refuse the licence if the CBFA judges 
that shareholders do not present enough guarantees with 
regard to the sound and prudent conduct of the bank. 
The law is even stricter than the autonomy agreement. 
For instance, the CBFA has the right to oppose the acqui-
sition of shares by a shareholder that would threaten the 
sound and prudent conduct of the bank. The CBFA can 
also suspend the shareholder’s voting rights and force this 
shareholder to dispose of his shares.
Although some elements of the agreement are redun-
dant given the current legislation, the agreement still 
remains relevant. In particular, the agreement deﬁ  nes 
very precisely the separation between the supervisory 
function of the board of directors and the management 
tasks of the managing board. It also details the scope of 
intervention of the board of directors and the managing 
board. In addition, appointment and dismissal procedures 
are established so as to offer more guarantees for the 
independence of management. Moreover, a remuneration 
philosophy is deﬁ  ned, limiting the variable elements that 
can be taken into account in the remuneration.
There is also still the problem of ﬁ  nancial conglomerates. 
The Financial Conglomerates Directives recommends co-
ordination and additional supervisory review with respect 
to capital adequacy, risk concentration at the level of 
the ﬁ  nancial holding company, internal control and risk 
management procedures and intra-group transactions. 
Indeed, article 8 of the Financial Conglomerates Directive 
stipulates that signiﬁ   cant intra-group transactions 
(i.e. transactions that exceed at least 5 p.c. of the total 
amount of capital adequacy requirements at the level 
of the conglomerate) are subject to supervisory review. 
In addition, article 9 introduces adequate procedures to 
guarantee that the risk surveillance systems are integrated 
and that the systems are compatible so as to allow the 
risks at the level of the ﬁ   nancial conglomerate to be 
measured, monitored and managed. However, one might 
wonder whether it sufﬁ  ciently  addresses  the  potential 
problem of internal conﬂ  icts of interest and of potential 
contagion between the sectors of activity. In Belgium, in 
particular, a new type of banking agreement could prob-
ably address more thoroughly the problems of transpar-
ency in risk accounting and efﬁ  cient  capital  allocation 
among the sectors of activity in order to avoid excessive 
cross-subsidisation.  (29)
4.2.4  Best practices in corporate governance
Corporate governance codes have become very fashionable 
in recent years.  (30) These codes generally aim at establishing 
goals, guidelines and best practices for the effective govern-
ance of listed ﬁ  rms, and are thus not speciﬁ  c to banks. Yet, 
they may cover some aspects of corporate governance rel-
evant for ﬁ  nancial stability. In particular, some of these codes 
identify best practices linked to some issues dealt with by 
the autonomy agreement. First, these codes very often cover 
best practices with regard to the role of the managing board, 
the (disclosure of the) remuneration of the managing board, 
potential conﬂ  icts of interest, etc. In addition, current codes 
also address the functioning, the composition and the remu-
neration of boards of directors and of some of its sub-com-
mittees. Among the other issues addressed by these codes, 
the most frequent recommendations relate to shareholders, 
ﬁ  nancial reporting and the internal and external audit func-
tion. While there is clearly some overlap between such codes 
and the agreement, this overlap is only partial, and codes 
do not necessarily make the agreement superﬂ  uous. Yet, it 
would be possible to envisage framing recommendations 
relating to bank stability within a revised agreement.
(28)  Under the European Company Statute, deﬁ  ned by the Council in 2001 
(Council Regulation No 2157/01 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a 
European Company), a company may have either a two-tier system with a 
supervisory board and a management board, or a one-tier system with an 
administrative board that manages the company. In the two-tier system, the 
management board (the members of the management board are appointed 
by the supervisory board) is responsible for managing the company. In the 
two-tier system, no person may be at the same time a member of both the 
management board and the supervisory board of the same company. The 
agreement seems thus to favour a hybrid (one and a half-tier ?) system where 
the members of the management board are members of the supervisory 
board. This raises the question whether the agreement should adopt a stricter 
deﬁ  nition or continue to promote hybrid structures (especially as some banks 
might want to adopt the European Company Statute).
(29)  Internal discipline can be reinforced by the introduction of internal cost of 
capital allocation schemes, as they complement the weak external market 
discipline of conglomerates (Boot, 2000).
(30)  See e.g. the Bouton White Paper in France, the Code on Corporate Governance 
of the Financial Reporting Council in the U.K., the Tabaksblat Report in the 
Netherlands or the OECD Corporat governance principles. In Belgium, the 
Corporate Governance Committee, established in January 2004 and chaired 
by Maurice Lippens, was set up at the initiative of the CBFA, the Federation of 
Belgian Enterprises and Euronext Brussels. The Committee has published a draft 
code on June 18, 2004. The Committee will publish the ﬁ  nal version of the 
code on December 9, 2004, after a public consultation.115
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5. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the corporate governance of 
banks and its implications for supervision. Banks are 
special, as banks’ debt holders are dispersed non-experts, 
and this impairs the proper exercise of debt governance. 
In addition, banks are subject to potential risk shifting by 
shareholders. Therefore, bank depositors are in need of a 
representative. This role is generally endorsed by a regula-
tory and supervisory authority (RSA).
When managerial pay is not too sensitive to share prices, 
managerial control should reduce excessive risk taking. 
Under these conditions, the RSA may favour managerial 
control (requiring management autonomy). In addition, 
the RSA may ﬁ  nd it advantageous to promote concen-
trated ownership, because of the potential to bail-in and 
the higher stability of ownership that is associated with 
concentration. In practice, however, managerial control 
and ownership concentration are difﬁ  cult to combine.
The Belgian supervisory model is based on an instrument 
– the agreement on the autonomy of bank management – 
that tries to reconcile concentrated ownership with man-
agement autonomy. The initial goal of the agreement 
was to avoid conﬂ  icts of interest within group structures. 
It aimed at limiting the abuse of the banking function 
by holding companies to promote their own ﬁ  nancial 
interests. Gradually, it also became an instrument to pro-
mote banking stability.
The agreement was last revised in 1992. In the meantime, 
changes have occurred in the ﬁ  nancial and legal environ-
ment. On the legislative front, new developments have 
taken place in terms of both company law and banking 
law. Moreover, corporate governance codes have been 
introduced. While these initiatives overlap with some of 
the main ideas of the agreement, they are not a perfect 
substitute for its insistence on managerial autonomy or its 
desire to promote shareholder stability.
More challenging are the market developments that 
have led to a new banking landscape in Belgium, with 
increased foreign ownership, less stable shareholding 
structures and the rise of ﬁ  nancial  conglomerates  that 
now control the main banks in Belgium. The conﬂ  icts of 
interests that were at the heart of the initial agreement, 
namely the granting of loans to troubled industrial share-
holders of banks, are now largely irrelevant. On the other 
hand, banking stability concerns are possibly more impor-
tant than ever, for two reasons. First, because the reduced 
stability of ownership makes potential bail-in (the second 
pillar of the agreement) problematic. And second, and 
more importantly, because the conglomerate structure 
of banking and insurance groups increases the potential 
conﬂ  icts between a centralised risk management at the 
holding level and the autonomy of bank management. 
Therefore, governance structures implemented by banks 
should remain a key issue in supervision.116
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Appendix 1  –   Historical perspective on the agreement on the autonomy of bank 
management in Belgium :
In Belgium, banking autonomy concerns were ﬁ  rst raised early in the thirties during the mixed banks crisis. The mixed 
banks were shareholders of ﬁ  rms that they ﬁ  nanced with the deposits they had raised. However, as they had been hit 
by the crisis that had started in 1929, these ﬁ  rms suddenly needed reﬁ  nancing. At that time, mixed banks faced a clear 
conﬂ  ict of interests. Indeed, they had to ﬁ  nd a balance between the interests of their depositors and the interests of the 
companies they owned. The mixed banks decided to provide assistance to the ailing ﬁ  rms they owned. As depositors 
subsequently started to withdraw their deposits, the liquidity of mixed banks became a serious concern. Therefore, 
mixed banks were banned by a Royal Decree in 1934. The existing mixed banks were divided into holding companies 
and pure deposit banks.
This split, however, did not entirely solve the potential conﬂ  ict of interests, as holding companies continued to exert 
their inﬂ  uence on the banks they were holding. Indeed, the holding companies were not only major shareholders of the 
new banks, but in many cases, boards of the two entities met together. In addition, in some cases, the holding company 
continued to intervene in lending decisions and sometimes was even informed of the bank’s results before the board of 
directors of the bank. Therefore, the newly established CB drew attention to the autonomy of bank management on 
several occasions (see e.g. Annual Report 1936 and 1937).
In this context, the CB tried to negotiate with the Société Générale de Belgique (then shareholder of the Banque de la 
Société Générale de Belgique) and with Bruﬁ  na (then shareholder of the Banque de Bruxelles), two holding companies, 
in order to decrease their participating interest in the credit institution they owned so as to limit it to 10 p.c. of the 
capital of the bank. In exchange for the forced disposal, the holding companies demanded exemption from taxation on 
the capital gains resulting from the sale. As this demand was rejected by the Ministry of Finance, the agreement was 
never applied.
The CB then approached the problem in a radically different way. Instead of trying to force holding companies to reduce 
their stake, in 1959 the Commission negotiated agreements with the holding companies in order to institutionalise their 
stakes in the bank. In other words, banks were no longer allowed to sell their stake without ﬁ  rst consulting the CB. In 
addition, the agreement comprised three other clauses. First the chairman of the bank was no longer allowed to hold 
a position in the holding company and had to guarantee the independence of the bank. Second, individual members 
of the management committee no longer reported to the board of directors but to the managing board. This provision 
was supplemented by the introduction of the concept of the collective responsibility of the managing board. Third, the 
agreement revised the composition of the board of directors and included mandatory independent members.
In 1969, Bruﬁ  na breached the agreement and sold a substantial share of its participating interest in the Banque de 
Bruxelles to Algemene Bank Nederland without informing the CB. This caused major political debates and fears of 
potential foreign control over Belgian banks. After lengthy discussions, the government agreed that the CB had to 
negotiate a new, stricter agreement that would apply in general to a large number of banks. In 1974, the agreement 
was extended to about 50 banks. The standard agreement was based on the two following pillars. First, the agreement 
implicitly set up a dual (two-tier) board system (the members of the managing board were chosen from among the 
members of the board of directors) in order to guarantee the independence of the management board. The managing 
board, in charge of the management of the bank, carried collegiate responsibility and its members were on equal 
footing. The board of directors was in charge of the deﬁ  nition of the general policy of the bank and of its supervision. 
With regard to its composition, neither the managers nor the representatives of signiﬁ  cant shareholders were allowed 
to represent a majority of the directors. Second, the agreement recognised a quasi-institutional role for signiﬁ  cant 
shareholders, which implied limitations on the transfer of ownership, in order to avoid the transmission of shares to an 
undesirable shareholder.
The content of the standard agreement was revised in 1992 for several reasons. First, a new regulatory context had 
emerged. The ﬁ  rst (1977) and second (1988) Banking Co-ordination Directives incorporated some elements of the 1974 
agreement such as the collegiality of the management board, the control of the status of shareholders, and the deﬁ  nition 
of sound and prudent policies. The Directives also gave formal legal power to the CB. Another change in the regulatory 
context was brought about by Basel I (1988), which obliged shareholders to strengthen the capital base if the regulatory 120
capital fell below a certain threshold. Second, certain developments in the banking sector highlighted the need for some 
revisions of the agreement. The increasing presence of foreign shareholders, as well as some limitations on the effective 
role played by the board of directors, forced the CBF to amend the 1974 agreement. Indeed, some shareholders were 
concerned about the fact that, in practice, the board of directors of most banks limited the scope of its intervention to 
a supervisory function. This problem threatened the stability of the shareholding structure as some shareholders would 
have incentives to dispose of their shares, since they were unable to effectively exert their responsibilities.
Although the spirit of the agreement remained unchanged, the agreement was therefore amended in 1992. The role 
of the board of directors and of its chairman was explicitly spelt out. The board of directors was in charge of the 
deﬁ  nition of the strategy, the plans and budgets, the structural reforms, and the deﬁ  nition of the relationship with the 
shareholders. In addition, the role of its chairman was to ensure the proper allocation of powers. The composition of 
the board of directors also changed, as limitations with regard to majority were abolished so that representatives of 
shareholders were allowed to cast a majority of the votes, increasing the power of major shareholders. The procedure for 
appointing the members of the managing board was also redeﬁ  ned and appointment required the approval of the CBF. 
With regard to major shareholders, their role and obligations remained unchanged, although their power increased.